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I. INTRODUCTION
The "other" agreement authorizes an arbitrator to resolve an existing
dispute, in contrast to the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
which arbitrates generically described future disputes. A typical CBA
promise to arbitrate future disputes might include a clause covering
"all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this agree-
ment." A typical submission of an existing dispute authorizes the ar-
bitrator to examine the grievant's discharge and decide whether the
discharge violated a "just cause" limitation in the CBA.
The third of three 1960 United States Supreme Court cases, United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. (Enterprise Wheel)'
reviewed a labor award and provides the doctrinal foundation for this
Article. One aspect of the Court's holding reviewed the remedy contained
in the award, which granted back pay to the grievants. The Court
concluded that the award was within the arbitrator's authority, both on
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1. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Three years earlier the Court discovered in the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. 185 (1982), judicial power to decree
specific performance of CBA promises to arbitrate future disputes. Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the statute as a grant of federal court jurisdiction regardless of diversity of the parties'
state citizenship. The statute amounts to a Congressional grant of a charter of federal
law to be judicially tailored as cases arise under the statute. For cases in federal court,
the strictures of the Norris-La Guardia Act on labor injunctions do not apply to the kind
of dispute (on arbitrabiity) presented in Lincoln Mills. See Feinsinger, Enforcement of
Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1957).
Professor Feinsinger was doubtful of the Court's reliance on legislative history in using
it to support this type of labor injunction. In Lincoln Mills, the Court held that Congress
rejected by implication "the common-law rule" referred to in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic
Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924). Both common law and equity generally render
compacts to arbitrate future disputes illusory. That non-statutory regime entitled either
party to revoke at will a promise to arbitrate, and such freedom extended to promises to
arbitrate an existing dispute. Until the award issued, a party could revoke and litigate,
cutting off the arbitration. An award, however, could bind the parties. Burchell v. Marsh,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854), demonstrates the finality of an award. The case arose on
the "equity side" of the former federal circuit court. The bill to set aside the award
succeeded, but the Supreme Court reversed. The submission underlying the award was
commercial. It consisted of disputes about existing claims, demands, and other existing
controversies. Id. at 346-47.
The Court found that the arbitrators had not exceeded the submission, and were not
guilty of corruption, misbehavior, or, as charged in the bill, of ignorance, and that they
had not made any mistake such as "would justify a court of chancery in annulling [the
award]." Id. at 352.
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that issue and on the Company's violation of the CBA.
This Article surveys cases reviewing awards for their congruence with
what the parties authorized the arbitrator to decide, described as their
"submission." The submission consists of a referral of an existing dispute
as a matter of collective bargaining to obtain the arbitrator's award.
Arbitration avoids resort to court or self help in resolving the dispute
if negotiation fails to result in a settlement.
The Court in Enterprise Wheel concluded that the award was within
the submission, and upheld the award with reference to the substantive
terms of the CBA. The Court held that an arbitrator does not sit to
dispense his/her own brand of industrial justice. The award must draw
its essence from the substantive terms of the CBA. The award at issue
met this "own-brand-essence" test.2
The two companion cases of the 1960 Trilogy, United Steelworkers
v. American Manufacturing Co. (American Manufacturing)3 and United
Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. (Warrior and GuiJ)4
provide guidelines for the exercise of courts' original jurisdiction in
applying procedural terms of the CBA when resolving the threshold
issue of arbitrability of the dispute. In each of these cases, the Union
sued to compel the employer's participation in arbitration. The Union
prevailed in both cases under the CBA arbitration clauses. In AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers Local 5090 (AT&T
Technologies)5 the Court also decided that the dispute was arbitrable.
By way of contrast, this Article begins with the Court's review of the
2. 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). This test of the relationship between an award and the
substantive terms was described as "a riddle enfolded in a paradox" after years of
experience with it. Jones, 'His Own Brand of Industrial Justice'. The Stalking Horse of
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REV. 881, 882 (1983). The instant
enterprise could have been prompted by such a daunting reflection on the rhetoric of a
passage in Enterprise Wheel, but was discovered after this Article began. Closer to the
mark is an acute observation that the "own-brand-essence" test has "displaced all its
rivals in the marketplace of judicial formulas." Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers Local
7441, 768 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986). Nevertheless,
it is recognized that "[a]n arbitral award is also subject to judicial vacation for want of
authority if it reaches beyond the boundaries of the 'submission,' the statement of the
issue as agreed upon by the parties." St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137,
1151 (1977). See Fairweather, The Submission of a Case to Arbitration in PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 225-31 (4th ed. 1985).
3. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
4. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
5. 475 U.S. 643 (1986). This case emphasizes that when a court is asked to determine
arbitrability of a grievance that issue is for judicial determination and the parties may
not be ordered to arbitrate it, even if the court must decide whether an issue based on
a substantive provision of the CBA is covered by the arbitration clause.
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award under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act 6 (LMRA section 301) in Enterprise Wheel.
Careless usage of "arbitrability" generates confusion between issues
for the arbitrator to decide and frustrates resolution of a dispute through
an award. The award may address both single-issue and multi-issue
disputes. For purposes of this Article, arbitrability as used here refers
to whether the dispute is within the scope of the CBA agreement to
arbitrate future disputes, but not to the issue or issues comprising the
dispute.
The three preliminary sections that follow seek to examine (1) "pro-
cedural arbitrability" for its worth in assessing issues the submission
includes, (2) submissions that include an issue based on a prior award,
and (3) submissions of arbitrability to the arbitration process instead of
resort to the courts to enforce the CBA agreement to arbitrate.
Cases from appellate courts and federal district courts for this study
relate primarily to Enterprise Wheel. Most of the cases selected are
not more than five years old. The principal passage from the Enterprise
Wheel opinion (significant for the lower-court authorities discussed here)
concludes that the Court "see[s] no reason to assume that this arbitrator
has abused the trust the parties confided in him and has not stayed in
the areas marked out for his consideration. It is not apparent that he
went beyond the submission. ' 7
The Court uses "submission" in cases deciding both arbitrability and
the finality of the award, rather than an award based on a bargained
submission waiving arbitrability, i.e., uncoerced by judicial decree. Sub-
sequently, the Court reviewed such an award in United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco, Inc. (Misco)5 and upheld it. The opinion
of the Court relies on Enterprise WheeP for the premise that the refusal
of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach.' 0
II. PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY
Arbitrability is used as a term for the issue whether the parties have
agreed to settle a current dispute by arbitration. "Procedural arbitra-
bility" refers to issues arising during the pre-arbitral grievance procedures
before the dispute itself becomes arbitrable. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
6. 29 U.S.C. 185 (1982).
7. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
8. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1988).
9. Id. at 370.
10. Id. Misco's confirmation of the award, based on the parties' voluntary submission,
yields its primary significance for this Article in supplementing Enterprise Wheel, where
the submission was judicially decreed.
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v. Livingston," the first case discussing procedural arbitrability in the
United States Supreme Court, furnishes an example. The CBA at issue
prescribed three successive "Steps" for grievance settlement by nego-
tiation between the parties prior to resort to arbitration, but neither
party had invoked these stages. The Court concluded that the dispute
was arbitrable, and held that "'procedural' questions which grow out
of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the
arbitrator."' 2 They are not conditions precedent to arbitrability, as the
Company argued in seeking a judicial determination that the dispute
was not arbitrable, but are initially for the arbitrator. The Court reasoned:
"It would be a curious rule which required that intertwined issues of
'substance' and 'procedure' growing out of a single dispute and raising
the same questions on the same facts had to be carved up between two
different forums, one deciding after the other." 3 John Wiley assimilated
(1) the issues arising from CBA grievance procedures prior to arbitration
with (2) the merits of a dispute under the substantive terms of the
CBA, in the event of an arbitrable dispute (3) under the CBA procedural
undertaking to arbitrate. Only the third issue, arbitrability of the dispute,
is resolved through judicial determination.
The opinion of the Court in Misco refers to John Wiley's teaching
as "our observation" that when the dispute is arbitrable, procedural
issues growing from the dispute and bearing on its resolution are for
the arbitrator.' 4 For this and for other reasons, 5 the Court concludes
that any assumed error of the arbitrator in excluding evidence from
consideration does not justify vacating the award. The Court's thus
tentatively formed category, procedural issues within a voluntary sub-
mission to arbitration, addresses the arbitrator's refusal to consider
evidence and quoted his objection: that the company could not discharge
the grievant "and then spend eight months digging up supporting evi-
dence to justify" the discipline imposed.' 6
Two cases preceding Misco had, in reviewing awards based on vol-
untary submissions, vacated awards based on procedural issues. In one
case the award sustained a grievance protesting unjust suspension and
discharge without cause.'7 The award was based on the Union's contention
that the Company's disclosure of its intention to discharge the grievant
before he was suspended violated the CBA requirement of five days'
11. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
12. Id. at 557.
13. Id.
14. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 364, 372 (1988).
Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J., approved the Court's opinion (adding
commentary only on what it did not decide) without specific reference to John Wiley.
Id. at 375.
15. See infra text accompanying note 16.
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suspension prior to discharge. The dissenting opinion defended the award;
the arbitrator's "determination of procedural fairness is sufficiently
integral to 'just cause' to sustain" the decision.18 The other case also
involved a just-cause grievance against discharge. This case involved
two five-day limits under the CBA, one within which the Union was to
raise the grievance with the supervisor of the grievant, and the other
within which the parties were to confer after the Union's complaint was
answered. 19 The arbitrator did not reach the merits, concerning a nurse's
discharge for an accumulation of dosage mistakes in following physicians'
prescriptions, but granted an award upholding the grievance because
the Company defaulted on the second limit for a Company-Union
conference. The Union's prior default in bringing the complaint to the
supervisor's attention (based on her testimony) moved the court to remand
to another arbitrator for resolution on the merits.20
Misco's "observation" from John Wiley has a guarded quality in that
the Court's opinion flanked that reference on one side with a passage
approving the arbitrator's assertion that his refusal to consider after-
acquired evidence was consistent with the practice of other arbitrators.
On the other side the Court stated that it is "worth noting" that the
award "did not forever foreclose" the Company from using the evidence
16. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 (1988). The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided against a grievant seeking judicial relief without
prior arbitration. The CBA provided for a hearing on such grievances within ten days
after a grievance had been delivered to the Company. The parties had defaulted in giving
the grievant a hearing, so the grievant in suing relied on CBA provisions that in default
of the hearing the case was "forfeited" and "deemed closed." Whether there was an issue
of the Union's fair representation does not appear, but in any event the Court concluded
that the grievant-plaintiff's case presented an arbitrable issue. Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc.,
767 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1985). This holding added a qualification not addressed in John
Wiley: the CBA language lacked "positive assurance" that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Id. at 689. Accord Nursing
Home Union v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1985).
The court directly ordered arbitration when the company refused to arbitrate on the
ground that the Union defaulted on the CBA requirement to notify the company of the
exact nature of the grievance. The order was based on another CBA provision that if
arbitrability is questioned, the determination of the question is for the arbitrator in the
first instance, and on John Wiley. United Food & Commercial Workers Locals 770, 889,
1442 v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 806 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1986). In another arbitrability case,
the court invoked John Wiley and affirmed the lower court's order requiring arbitration.
The court relied on the CBA provision for arbitration of arbitrability as including issues
of timeliness in the procedure prior to arbitration. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local
4-447 v. Chevron Chem. Co., 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2232 (5th Cir. 1987).
17. Johnston Boiler Co. v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 893, 753 F.2d
40 (6th Cir. 1985).
18. Id. at 43. In Shopmen's Local 539 v. Mosher Steel Co., 796 F.2d 1361 (1lth
Cir. 1986), the Union requested arbitration after the CBA time limit expired, but the
Company waited until the first day of the hearing to object. The arbitrator rendered an
award on the merits after deciding for the Union on waiver. The court upheld the award
on the ground that the timeliness issue was one for the arbitrator.
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as the basis for discharge. 2' These cautionary signals could have been
linked to an explicit comparison between what the Court referred to as
"evidentiary matters" 22 and issues (as in John Wiley and Flair Builders)
related to promptness in grievance negotiations prior to the arbitration
itself. Since the Court's opinion in Misco did not draw such a distinction,
it seems impetuous to take the case as authoritatively including pro-
cedural issues relating to the conduct of the arbitration hearing as
specimens of "procedural arbitrability." If so, questions remain con-
cerning the scope of judicial review of an award rendered on procedural
issues, as compared with the bargaining freedom the parties enjoy under
American Manufacturing, Warrior and Gulf, and AT&T Technologies
with regard to substantive issues. A case resembling Flair Builders
resulted in remand for further arbitration, when the Union had delayed
for over three years in submitting the dispute. The award granted back
pay to each grievant measured by half-an-hour a day for a three year
period. The arbitrator noted that the parties' relationship appeared
amicable because they had not been strictly observing procedures, but
the Court's remand was for a determination of what was a reasonable
time for the Union to have gone forward.23
Misco has opened a Pandora's Box of determining whether the
procedural-arbitrability concept extends to procedural issues arising dur-
ing the arbitration hearing. The Court has yet to undertake clarification
of that concept as it relates to judicial review of awards. Given such
a CBA provision imposing time limits on steps in negotiating a grievance,
may the parties effect by their submission the preservation of a timeliness-
waiver issue (for example, reservation of a wider judicial review than
the "own-brand-essence" test)? If no such CBA provision exists, consider
the alternatives for the parties in negotiating the submission when the
CBA provides that the substantive issue or issues are arbitrable.
19. Asociacion de Senoras Damas v. Unidad Laboral de Enfermeras y Empleados de
la Salud, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3357 (D.P.R. 1987).
20. The court employed the "own-brand-essence" test in that the arbitrator ignored
the supervisor's testimony and indulged in an unbalanced application of the similar five-
day provisions. In Johnston Boiler, the court also used the "own-brand-essence" test,
rather than the dissenter's characterization of the issue as procedural. Johnston Boiler
Co. v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 893, 753 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir. 1985).
21. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 (1988). In
Johnston Boiler, the court did not respond to the dissenting opinion. It appears that the
issue for the court was not one of "procedural arbitrability."
22. But nothing in Misco suggests that the parties may not preserve (by apt CBA
language or reservations in the submission) issues of procedural arbitrability for judicial
review of the award. The Court's opinion is at pains, ins6far as hearing procedures are
concerned, to refer to a CBA provision that prohibited the arbitrator from considering
hearsay evidence and to conclude that "evidentiary matters were otherwise left to the
arbitrator" by section VI of the CBA. Id. at 371.
23. Pinkerton's NY Racing Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Service Employees Local 32E, 805
F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1986).
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III. A FORMER AWARD
Suppose that the parties, pursuant to a decree compelling submission
of a grievance dispute, take issue before the arbitrator on the effect of
a prior award between the same parties under the same CBA. In W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 75924 the Court addressed the
effect of a prior award and concluded that only the subsequent award
was subject to judicial review. That award, of arbitrator B, was contrary
to arbitrator A's award.
The former award (by arbitrator A) was the result of a back-pay
grievance, 25 which the arbitrator denied. The Union did not contest the
award. Subsequently, arbitrator B heard another of the back-pay griev-
ances similar to the first award, but this time sustained it. Arbitrator
B concluded that arbitrator A's award did not draw its essence from
the CBA. The Court sustained the award, testing it on several grounds,
including the "own-brand-essence" test. The critical significance of W.R.
Grace lies in its affirmance of the court of appeal's decision to sustain
the subsequent award,26 while explicitly rejecting the prior-award law
of the court of appeals. The Court reviewed the subsequent award while
declining to review the former award, whereas the court of appeals
considered it essential to review the former award and vacate it for the
subsequent award to stand.27
W.R. Grace is part of the Court's interpretation of LMRA section
301 holding that when the parties agree to arbitrate a labor dispute
arising under a CBA, issues within that dispute belong initially to
arbitration rather than litigation. In W.R. Grace the Court for the first
24. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
25. Arbitration was compelled. Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Rubber Workers Local
759, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978). The Company reinstated grievants in compliance with
the court's decision, but the back-pay grievance went to arbitration. The first one to reach
arbitration is the subject of arbitrator A's award.
26. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 652 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1981),
affd, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
27. The Court stated that the court of appeals was correct in enforcing the subsequent
award, "although it seems to have taken a somewhat circuitous route to this result." W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1983). Its initial
premise that the validity of the former award was relevant evoked the Court's disagreement.
"Only the enforceability of the [subsequent] award is at issue." Id. at 765 n.7. Judge
Williams, writing for the panel, subsequently observed that the Court "took the easy way
out." Judge Williams expressed the view that if the award is based upon the 'essence
of the contract' and interprets and applies a provision of that contract, [the award] is
and should be binding on the parties for the duration of that contract." Williams, Arbitration
in Court: Judging the Judges, in PROCEEDINGS OFTHE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNuAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 21, 28 (W. Gershenfeld ed. 1986).
i
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time supplemented the Enterprise Wheel holding on scope of judicial
review of an award. 28
Lower courts' decisions in consonance with W.R. Grace include IBEW
Local 199 v. United Telephone Co. 29 When the Union won an award
through arbitration, that award suited it so well it sued for declaratory
judgment that the award be "binding precedent" for future arbitrations.
The Union lost. The court's opinion aptly summarizes the law of W.R.
Grace "[T]he federal policy of judicial non-interference [with] and
preservation of the dignity of the arbitral process requires that the
development and imposition of a binding 'law of the contract' be achieved
by the arbitral system itself...."10
An intriguing issue of "grooming" regulation joins on-the-job tonsorial
care of facial hair to care off-duty and off-premises. The Union's National
Agreement with the Company in section 144 required employees to
"comply with the reasonable standards of personal regulations issued
by the Company," a CBA provision reviewed in Trailways Lines v.
Trailways Joint Council.3 The submission stipulated that the arbitrator
(M) was to decide whether the Company violated the CBA when it
required two grievants, mechanics employed "in the St. Louis garage,
to shave off their beards [and] [i]f so, what should be the remedy?"3 2
M found violations in that the requirement was unreasonable. The award
required the Company to cease enforcing its policy as a no-beard
requirement of employees at garage facilities, but the Company has a
right to require their beards to be neat and well trimmed.
At the arbitration hearing the Company introduced an award rendered
three months earlier by arbitrator L. That award denied the grievance;
the no-beards rule was not unreasonable.3 3 The court affirmed the district
28. Misco supplemented W.R. Grace, which addressed a public policy issue, collateral
to the integrity of the award under the submission (which was compelled by judicial
decree). The justices in Misco agreed that they had granted certiorari to resolve a division
among the courts on when to set awards aside as contravening public policy. Justices
Blackmun and Brennan, however, wrote that the opinion of the Court did not reach that
issue. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 375 (1988).
Counsellors will probably consult both Misco and W.R. Grace on the cloud of public
policy, seeing that both upheld an award if found otherwise binding as a matter of
collective bargaining. Contrast Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), dis-
missing the writ to a state court because no substantial federal question was presented.
The decision of the state supreme court involved only the state's construction of a local
contract under local law. The just-cause issue on the grievant's discharge under the contract
between the parties "cannot be construed, and will not be enforced, to protect activities
by a Communist on behalf of her party whether in the guise of unionism or otherwise."
Id. at 299, quoting Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 809, 278 P.2d 905,
916 (1955). But see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
29. 738 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1984).
30. Id. at 1571.
31. 807 F.2d 1416, 1417 (8th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, en banc, 817 F.2d 1333 (1987).
32. Id. at 1418.
33. Id.
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court order, and vacated M's award under the "own-brand-essence"
test.3 4 The court of appeals identified arbitrator M's analysis as "in
large part a verbatim copy" from M's 1981 award in another matter.35
On the petition for rehearing en banc, the dissenting opinion expounded
the view that both L's and M's awards drew their essence from the
CBA. The opinion dissented from denial of the petition for rehearing
and distinguishes between the issue of violation and that of remedy and
disagrees with the court in avoiding the question whether M exceeded
his authority in addressing the grooming policy of the Company across
the board to employees at garage facilities (rather than the two grievants).
The opinion concludes, with the district court, that the submission
authorized only a remedy necessary to resolve the grievance of the two
employees.36
United Paperworkers Union Local 1206 v. Georgia Pacific Corp.37
held that an award sustaining grievances of three stock preparation
helpers did not bind the Company with respect to subsequently-filed
grievances of thirty other stock preparation helpers. As to the three
beneficiaries of the award, the arbitrator found the Company in violation
of the CBA in depriving them of the opportunity to work twenty-eight
hours overtime by assigning the work to laborers. While the Company
paid the award, the Union filed suit on behalf of the thirty grievants
arguing that the Company's use of laborers instead of giving overtime
opportunity to the thirty grievants was a wilful refusal to carry out the
award. The court held that the courts should abstain from anticipating
the arbitrator's decision on prospective effect of an award unless it
appears that "the current conduct inarguably falls"38 within the award.
The court contrasted the twenty-eight-hour award to three grievants
with the "current conduct" of the Company towards the other numerous
grievants.
In Mine Workers District 12 UMW v. Peabody Coal Co.39 the court
phrased its formula for reserving the question of an award's prospective
34. Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 624 F. Supp. 880, 885
(E.D. Mo. 1985), affd, 807 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1986). The district court also concluded
that M exceeded the submission in that his award contained an unwarranted remedy.
The sole issue limited the remedy "to what the arbitrator reasonably believed would
restore the grievants to the position they would have been in but for the employer's breach
of contract." Id.
35. Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 807 F.2d 1416, 1422 (8th
Cir. 1986).
36. Judge Heaney, joined by Judges Lay, McMillan, and Arnold, dissented. Trailways
Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 817 F.2d 1333 (8th Cir. 1987).
37. 798 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 173-74.
39. 602 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Ill. 1985).
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effect to arbitration in terms of "positive assurance. '40 This means the
award was intended to cover the present dispute, rather than whether
the current conduct inarguably falls within the award. In 1974, the
arbitrator's award agreed with the Company's right to abolish the
exclusively first shift job of belt repair persons, but decided that the
Company could not assign the displaced grievants to rotating shifts.
Almost nine years later, the Union sued the Company for violating the
award when assignments were made to rotating shifts. The court refers
to three intervening CBA's implemented since the award, and notes
variations that include the addition of provisions related to work-force
re-alignments. Under these circumstances the court disagreed with the
Union, holding that its case did not meet the "positive assurance"
criterion.
When an arbitrator hears a former-award issue within a submission
compelled by judicial decree, W.R. Grace holds that the arbitrator has
authority to determine the effect of the former award. A court may
review only the subsequent award. The lower court cases reviewed here
extend this holding to former awards based on the parties' bargained
submission. The cases are consistent with W.R. Grace in limiting judicial
review of an award when the union seeks to enforce it, and the prospective
effect of the award is at issue.
This discussion of procedural arbitrability and former awards con-
stitutes a background for close examination of the effects of the sub-
mission on judicial review of the award.
W.R. Grace appears to channel the issue of a former award to an
initial determination by arbitration, although the Trailways holding
demonstrates that within the own-brand-essence test of the subsequent
award, the court may, as the dissenting opinion points out, prefer the
result of the former award.4'
40. The court adopted this language from a case prior to W.R. Grace, in United Mine
Workers Dist. 5 v. Consolidated Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981). The court
rejected "strict [material] factual identity" from Oil Workers Local 4-1600 v. Ethyl Corp.,
644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1981). The opinion discusses but does not embrace the position
that mere disagreement between the parties suffices to leave the dispute for arbitration.
Mine Workers Dist. 12 UMW v. Peabody Coal Co., 602 F. Supp. 240, 242 (S.D. Ill.
1985) (quoting Little Six Corp. v. UMW Local 8332, 701 F.2d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1983)
and citing Boston Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen, 659 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1981)).
41. Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 817 F.2d 1333, 1337 (8th
Cir. 1987).
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IV. SUBMISSION OF SUBSTANTIVE
ARBITRABILITY
"Substantive arbitrability" describes whether the CBA requires an
existing dispute to be resolved by arbitration.42 As shown above, John
Wiley and Flair Builders distinguish between issues of procedural ar-
bitrability and the arbitrability of the dispute. Those cases denied a
party immediate access to court (under Warrior and Gulf) to litigate
procedural arbitrability, when the dispute itself was arbitrable. An issue
of procedural arbitrability, if the dispute is judicially determined to be
arbitrable, comes within the arbitrator's authority, at least initially,
similar to the effect of a former award.
Only Misco, W.R. Grace, and Enterprise Wheel furnish precedent
for judicial review of awards under LMRA section 301, and only Misco
reviews an award from a submission that is itself the product of
bargaining on arbitrability of the dispute. The parties may submit
substantive arbitrability in addition to the merits if the arbitrator finds
the dispute arbitrable. The party contending that the dispute is not
arbitrable (usually the employer) may prefer arbitration of that issue
over litigation, hoping for a decision that the dispute is not arbitrable,
or at least a favorable award on the merits.
Local 369 Utility Workers v. Boston Edison Co.43 presents a different
pattern: the parties limited their submission to whether the dispute was
arbitrable. The submission was phrased: "Does the issue raised by P&M
Grievance No. 2089 dated November 14, 1979 present an arbitral
difference between the parties under the collective bargaining agree-
ment?" 44 This constituted the entirety of the submission. The grievance
at issue complained of the denial of benefits under the parties' Industrial
Accident Benefit Plan when the grievant was laid off due to a reduction
of the work force.
The CBA provided that officers of the Company, the Medical Director
and the Vice President in Charge of Employee Relations, would decide
all issues arising under the Plan, including questions of total and partial
incapacity for work. The CBA provided that their decisions were final.
Under the CBA, a Board of Arbitration heard all grievance disputes,
and its awards were final (bringing them within LMRA section 301
finality as Enterprise Wheel defined it). Paralleling Enterprise Wheel,
the CBA also provided an exception to finality in that the Board had
42. The CBA itself may require initial submission to arbitrate substantive arbitrability.
United Food & Commercial Workers Locals 770, 889, 1442 v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 806
F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1986).
43. 752 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1984).
44. Utility Workers Local 369 v. Boston Edison Co., 588 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Mass.),
affd, 752 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
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no power to add to, subtract from, or modify any terms of the CBA.
The CBA extended the Board's jurisdiction to cover grievance disputes,
defined as any dispute concerning the true interpretation and meaning
of the CBA terms, or rates of pay or other conditions of employment
not settled by the CBA.
Thus, the CBA covered finality of decisions under the Plan along
with finality of arbitral awards. The Plan administrators terminated the
grievant's benefits when he was laid off. Should the Board attend to
the meaning of a provision in the Plan requiring cessation of benefits
when the beneficiary retires or is otherwise terminated?
In this final-final opposition, the Board's award attributed finality to
the Company's termination of benefits: the dispute was not arbitrable.
The court dove between the finality horns (Plan administrators'
decisions and CBA awards) and concluded that the award of non-
arbitrability did not draw its essence from the CBA.45 The court viewed
the Plan's procedure, investing Company with authority officials to
terminate benefits, as subordinate to the finality of the Board's awards
on the merits. The Board abdicated its function to hear and decide
grievance disputes. The court reasoned that the Plan's procedure cannot
be read as including the discretion to determine all CBA standards and
rules for the entire class of Plan beneficiaries. The court contrasted
that discretion with the administrators' resolution of disputed facts
bearing upon an individual claim to benefits. Furthermore, the arbitration
clause of the CBA does not exclude the administrators' determinations
from the grievance disputes subject to the Board's authority. The CBA
clause refers to "any dispute... concerning the true interpretation and
meaning of this Agreement .... ,46 "Any dispute" includes the substantive
provision of the Plan that required cessation of benefits when the
beneficiary's employment is "terminated." Upholding the award "leaves
no room for any sensible theory of judicial review"; 47 such a result
thrusts jurisdiction on the court either to adjudicate the meaning of
"terminated" de novo, and accord finality to the administrators' decision,
or to engage in some deferential scope of review. The court characterizes
de novo review as "completely anomalous; just because deference had
been accorded the arbitrator's [the Board's] award, no deference at all
would.., be accorded a decision-maker more subordinate than the
arbitrator. '48 The court further explained that some deferential scope
of review of the administrators' decision by the court would be incon-
sistent with the role of courts in reviewing awards, drawing courts into
45. Utility Workers Local 369 v. Boston Edison Co., 752 F.2d 1, 2 (lst Cir. 1984).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id.
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an area of expertise conferred by the parties on their chosen arbitrators
instead of referring their disputes to litigation.
The court's no-essence conclusion on the invalidity of the award
advanced its review into the subject of this Article. The parties' sub-
mission did not include the merits of the dispute. However, the court
remanded the matter to the Board for a consideration of the merits, or
the meaning of the substantive CBA provision for cessation of Plan
benefits when the employment of the beneficiary was terminated. The
court reserves the amount of deference owed to the administrators'
decision to the arbitrator. This method of resolving arbitrability by
judicial decree in the form of remand is tangent to a bargained sub-
mission, and suggests a supplement to Warrior and Gulf and other
Supreme Court interpretations of the arbitrability doctrine.
Boston Edison serves to introduce other lower court cases on arbi-
trability, but none of them review an award resting on a submission of
arbitrability alone (without reference to the merits). The cases that
follow demonstrate that a party may reserve the issue of arbitrability
while conditionally submitting the merits.49 However, the holdings differ
on how to accomplish this reservation.
Avis Rent A Car System v. Garage Employees Local 2720 holds
that a clearly lodged objection to the other party's procedures in choosing
an arbitrator preserves the objection for future judicial determination.
The court further held that the party's objection is not waived by
participating in the hearing before the arbitrator is selected by virtue
of the other party's selection procedures. In International Association
of Heat and Frost Insulators Local 34 v. General Pipe Covering, Inc.,51
another case concerning arbitrator selection, the CBA provided: "Any
controversy which cannot be settled informally by the Trade Board
parties shall be referred to a neutral arbitrator chosen by mutual
agreement of the parties. '52 The Trade Board rendered an award con-
tested by the Union. The Union urged that the dispute should have
continued on to a neutral arbitrator because the Trade Board (composed
of three representatives of each of the parties) failed to settle the dispute.
The court rejected the Union's interpretation of "the Trade Board
parties." They are not the parties before the Board, but its members.
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
50. 791 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1986). Cf. Supermarkets General Corp. v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Local 919, 645 F. Supp. 831 (D. Conn. 1986)(award by arbitrator
chosen through AAA procedures confirmed, as against party contesting the award, whose
request for selection through state agency was untimely).
51. 792 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1986).
52. Id. at 99.
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The six members were authorized to make their award.53
A party contesting an award on judicial review may learn that the
arbitrability issue was raised too late. In Jones Dairy Farm v. United
Food & Commercial Workers Local P-1236,54 the parties agreed upon
the choice of an arbitrator, and went forward at the hearing on a
grievance claiming the Company had contracted out some janitorial
work previously done by bargain-unit members. The submission included
the following CBA provision:
"With respect to the subcontracting of work, and the performance of work
at this plant rather than elsewhere, each party retains its legal rights as in
effect prior to execution of this Agreement, and nothing in the Agreement
shall be construed as adding to or subtracting from those rights.""5
The award sustained the grievance. In the view of the arbitrator, the
Company's subcontracting lacked protection under the CBA reservation
of its legal rights. The court upheld the award, holding that when a
party goes forward with a submission under a CBA substantive provision
containing a "legal rights" qualification, that party has consented to
arbitration of the legal rights issue, absent a timely objection to the
arbitrator's authority.
Another court's elaboration under LMRA section 301 on the reser-
vation of arbitrability for judicial review is Dreis & Krump Manufac-
turers International Association v. Machinists District 8.56 The statute,
according to the court, provides that a suit seeking to set aside an
award is a suit for breach of contract, i.e., the arbitration clause of the
CBA. But the opinion in Dreis continues with attention to the submission.
Should the CBA clause on management rights have been so broad as
to have made nonarbitrable a decision to subcontract work, the Company
had two options: (1) refuse to arbitrate or, (2) submit the dispute to
arbitration "under protest. ' 57 The Company failed to take either option
and therefore lost the arbitrability issue.
53. Id. at 99-100. The members of the Board did not deadlock. When a National
Arbitration Committee deadlocked 3-3 on three discharge grievances, and the CBA provided
for the dispute in such event to be referred to an impartial arbitrator, the court ordered
that the dispute be referred to the arbitrator for resolution. International Union of Elevator
Constructors v. National Elevator Indus., 772 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1985).
54. 760 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985).
55. Id. at 174. The opinion refers to the law of the Seventh Circuit and of the NLRB.
The NLRB had repudiated its Milwaukee Spring Div. I decision, 265 N.L.R.B. 206
(1982), in Milwaukee Spring Div. II, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), arriving at a position
favorable to employers in a case related to subcontracting. But neither failure of the
arbitrator to predict the NLRB's change of heart or the arbitrator's refusal to be bound
by Seventh Circuit precedent moved the court to set aside the award. Jones Dairy Farm
v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local P-1236, 760 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1985).
56. 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986).
57. Id. at 252.
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Teamsters Local 764 v. J.H. Merritt & Co., 58 a much-cited case,
reviewed a submission based on a grievant's discharge on September
16, 1983, when no CBA was in existence. The parties concluded an
agreement the following month.59 The CBA contained an arbitration
procedure and, substantively, a limitation against discharge without just
cause. The procedure provided for a Joint Arbitration Board as arbitrator.
The Board sustained the grievance and awarded reinstatement with back
pay after hearing the merits. On judicial review, the Company argued
for the first time that the dispute resolved by the award was not
arbitrable. The court sustained the award but rejected the Company's
argument as failing either on a theory of waiver or implied submission
of arbitrability.
In Jones Dairy Farm, Dreis, and J.H. Merritt the parties' submission
rendered the award valid as against attack on judicial review based on
non-arbitrability. Those submissions were bargained, not judicially de-
termined. Similarly, in Knollwood Cemetary v. United Steelworkers,0
the parties' submission was not coerced by a decree, but it had been
subjected to a compulsion differing from a judicial order to arbitrate.
The Company responded to the Union's demand for arbitration arguing
that, as in J.H. Merritt, there was no CBA provision for arbitration.
The Union then filed charges with the NLRB, and thereafter the parties
entered into an agreement to settle by submitting the dispute to arbi-
tration. That agreement was effective, in the court's opinion upholding
the award, in that the arbitrator's recognition that the dispute was
arbitrable had a rational basis in the submission.
The focus of this Article on bargained submission rather than judicial
review of an award through comparison with prior CBA's yields the
preceding cases that exclude a courtroom attack on the award as
exceeding arbitrability, unless reserved timely in the arbitration. That
principle emerges as LMRA section 301 law under those cases examining
the submission. J.H. Merritt and Knollwood focus critical emphasis on
the submission in that the employer in both cases belatedly raised the
issue of arbitrability.
Two cases discussing the failure to maintain an objection to arbitra-
58. 770 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1985).
59. The parties agreed to settle the strike through an oral agreement. Disputes
concerning reinstatement of strikers ensued. The parties then entered into a written
submission. This "subsequent CBA" bound the panel of arbitrators so designated to the
memorandum if a majority found that "any or all of the Employers party to this
Memorandum of Agreement did agree" to a strike settlement. The submission also specified
that the panel would have "no equitable or interest authority or jurisdiction. Its sole
authority and jurisdiction is specifically set forth in this Memorandum." Local Joint Board
of Las Vegas Local 226 v. Riverboat Casino, Inc., 817 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1987).
60. 789 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1986).
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bility before the arbitrator are George Day Construction Co. v. United
Brotherhood Carpenters Local 35461 and Orange Belt Dist. Council of
Painters v. Kashak.62 Both holdings instruct the party challenging the
award on judicial review how to persuade the arbitrator to find against
arbitrability and, failing that, how to preserve the issue of arbitrability
for judicial review in the event the award on the merits goes against
the party.
In George Day, the parties at the hearing argued the question of
arbitrability along with the merits. In reviewing the award's basis both
on arbitrability and the merits, the court refused to reconsider arbitra-
bility and upheld the award on the merits. The court judged from the
Company's conduct in arguing arbitrability at the arbitration hearing
that "it becomes readily apparent that the parties have consented to
allow the arbitrator to decide the entire controversy, including the
question of arbitrability. '63 In Kashak, the employer's objection to
arbitrability at the hearing was phrased as reserving "all [the employer's]
rights to object to the arbitration based upon any defenses [the employer]
might have to the collective bargaining agreement itself."64 The court
held that the objection would not effect reservation of the arbitrability
issue for judicial review.
Little significance should be attributed to the incoherence of the just-
quoted "reservation." At the beginning of the hearing, the arbitrator
must take the initiative, if necessary, to clarify whether the parties agree
that the dispute is arbitrable. If they do not, two principal questions
require prompt resolution: Is the party opposing arbitration seeking to
be heard on that issue? If so, does that party reserve judicial review
of the arbitrator's decision if the arbitrator should find the dispute
arbitrable? Clarification of these questions requires early attention for
another reason, ie., whether two hearings are necessary. If the parties
seek to be heard on the merits, and should the arbitrator find the
dispute arbitrable, the arbitrator must attend to scheduling. The arbi-
trator may have to decide, if the parties disagree, whether to schedule
a hearing on arbitrability first, and a later hearing on the merits if the
dispute is held arbitrable.
This discussion of cases in lower courts reviewing awards on bargained
submissions including the merits provides a transition. It concludes the
preliminary topics on issues for arbitration within arbitrable disputes,
61. 722 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1984).
62. 774 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1985).
63. George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. Carpenters Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471,
1475 (9th Cir. 1984).
64. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. Kashak, 774 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir.
1985).
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procedural arbitrability and former awards. The transition moves towards
the focus of the article: judicial review of awards on bargained sub-
missions (excluding arbitrability). The remaining topics deal with modes
of submission, discharge grievances, awards denying damages for breach
of a no-strike provision in the CBA, job security cases, and incomplete
awards.
V. MODES OF SUBMISSION
A hearing should begin with a clean slate for the arbitrator. Any ex
parte approaches to the arbitrator prior to the hearing should be promptly
disclosed. If the arbitrator finds that they were of such gravity as in
themselves to be disqualifying, the disclosure will account to the parties
for further declining to serve.
The parties and the arbitrator must concentrate on the reason for
the hearing, or what the parties agree to submit. Frequently the parties
will not have anticipated this need with the same level of intensity as
that encountered in preparation for litigation. This informality is one
of arbitration's attractions.
Instances of judicial review of awards about modes of submission of
the dispute to the arbitrator include two cases in which the CBA provided
the method of submitting the dispute. The following discussion further
examines the effects of the mode of submission on judicial review of
the awards.
When the parties formally agree upon the submission and provide
the arbitrator with a document purportedly embodying their agreement,
judicial review of the award appears to resemble, in considerable degree,
litigation interpreting a written contract. The following is an example
of a CBA provision foreshadowing the beginning of the arbitration
hearing: "At the commencement of the arbitration hearing, the parties
shall submit in writing the question or questions to be decided by the
arbitrator .... -65 There the court attending to such a requirement con-
cluded: "Although the submission agreement was not reduced to writing,
the transcript shows that counsel for the employer, [and] counsel for
the Union, with the arbitrator's approval, agreed upon a submission
agreement. '66 Hence, the court found the arbitrator did not disregard
the CBA. But in St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis Theatrical
Brotherhood Local 6,67 the court affirmed the partial vacation of an
award because it violated the CBA provision that "[t]he Arbitrator may
consider and decide only the particular issue or issues presented by the
65. Hilton Int'l Co. v. Union de Trabajadores de la Industria Gastronomico Local
610, 600 F. Supp. 1446, 1450 (D.P.R. 1985).
66. Id.
67. 715 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983).
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grievance or by the parties submitted to him in writing and only issues
relating to the interpretation and/or application of the agreement. '6
This language limits the arbitrator's authority in two directions: (1) from
the submission and, (2) from the CBA. The court, however, does not
indicate whether the submission consisted of the grievance (against
discharge) or was based on written issues as stated by the parties. The
case was decided on the "own-brand-essence" branch of Enterprise
Wheel.69
, It is customary to refer to a formal submission as the parties'
"stipulation." The parties, however, may authorize the arbitrator to
formulate the submission.70 The court in Piggly Wiggly Operators'
Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Truck Drivers Local 171 described
the submission as the equivalent of legal pleadings, joining the issues
and empowering the arbitrator to decide them. Many hearings proceed
on an oral agreement submitting a grievance. The grievance, in turn,
may refer to the CBA, either generally or by reference to its specific
provisions. In the absence of a prior CBA provision for arbitrating future
disputes, the submission of a current dispute becomes in itself the basis
for an award. 72
68. Id. at 407.
69. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
The holding is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. The CBA provided that an
employee violating its prohibition of work stoppages would be subject to discharge and
"shall have no recourse to any other provisions of this Agreement except as to the fact
of participation." St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis Theatrical Bhd. Local 6, 715 F.2d
405, 408 (8th Cir. 1983). The arbitrator's authority was exhausted when he found the
grievant guilty of an unauthorized work stoppage, and the award was properly vacated
insofar as it mitigated the discharge by reinstatement and partial back pay. Cf. supra
notes 2 & 5.
70. "Because the authority of arbitrators is a subject of collective bargaining, just as
is any other contractual provision, the scope of the arbitrator's authority is itself a question
of contract interpretation that the parties have delegated to the arbitrator." W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 765 (1983). The context of this
quotation makes it clear that the Court is not referring to the submission, but to the
arbitrator's authority to resolve an arbitrable dispute by reference to the substantive terms
of the CBA. See S. KAGEL, ANATOMY OF A LABOR ARBITRATION 171-74 (2d ed. 1986),
for a sample submission and persuasive arguments with suggestions about other modes
of submission. Id. at 73-79, 127-28, 135-36. See also M. GROSSMAN, THE QUESTION OF
ARBITRABILITY: CHALLENGES TO THE ARBITRATOR'S JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY 49-
50 (1984), for a discussion of disagreement between the parties on the submission. In a
court-ordered arbitration case, the court formulated the submission but allowed the
arbitrator to decide whether to permit amendment of the issues. New York Tel. Co. v.
Telephone Traffic Union, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2086 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
71. 611 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1980).
72. Cases reviewing awards based on submission of disputes by "subsequent CBAs"
include Teamsters Local 764 v. J.H. Merritt & Co., 770 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1985), and
Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas 226 v. Riverboat Casino, 817 F.2d 524 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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VI. DISCHARGE GRIEVANCES
The grievance in Piggly Wiggly disputed the discharge of a driver.
At the hearing, the Company contended that the grievant became
uninsurable and was discharged under a CBA provision requiring in-
surance. The Union argued that the CBA contained no such requirement.
The arbitrator examined negotiations leading to a CBA draft signed by
the parties and concluded that no agreement was reached on the in-
surance condition. This conclusion was one ground for the award, which
sustained the grievance. Although there was no separate contract of
submission, the court upheld the award on the theory that the parties
presented the entire grievance and thereby empowered the arbitrator
"to decide the issues stated in the grievance. '73
In Lackawanna Leather Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
District 271,74 the court, upholding the award, held that an arbitrator
does not exceed the scope of the submission as long as the decision
stays "within the areas marked out for his consideration.175 The CBA
provided for discharge of an employee who, within a year, received
three written notices for various derelictions, including inefficiency and
absenteeism. The third notice charged the employee with poor perform-
ance in operating a hide-shaving machine, and was accompanied by a
discharge notice which recounted the two prior notices. The grievance
claimed that the Company discharged the grievant for refusing to take
vacation time during a plant shutdown rather than draw unemployment
compensation. The grievance protested that the third warning notice
and discharge were "not for justifiable cause as per the labor agree-
ment." 76 The arbitrator gave the three-notices provision a narrow reading,
viewing the notices as cumulative rather than the Company's combination
of the third notice with the other two different infractions. The arbitrator
found that the third notice was justified, but the award ordered
reinstatement.
A three-judge dissent argued for remand to arbitration for consid-
eration of an exhibit that tended to support the Company's combination
of the three notices on the basis of past practice. This dissent denounced
73. Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Truck Drivers Local
1, 611 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1980). In Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 17, 619 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Mass. 1985), the Arbitration Board was held
to have exceeded its authority in reaching the issue of the validity of the CBA because
the parties agreed that the issue had not been part of the grievance nor had it been
discussed at the hearing. See also Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986);
Champion Int'l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Local 37, 779 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.
1985).
74. 706 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983).
75. Id. at 235 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
76. Id. at 231.
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the arbitrator's work as a "clear deprivation of industrial due process."' 7
One of the three dissenters wrote separately, asserting that the arbitrator
had sandbagged the Company, having "sub silentio sprung his own
interpretation on this non-issue in the award without an iota of evidence
in the record to support it, all in apparent direct conflict with past
company practices as recognized by all the parties. '78
The court's opinion states that the parties had adduced no evidence
concerning the meaning of the three-notices provision of the CBA, but,
in effect, arbitrators need not foresee an issue first broached upon
judicial review of the award.79 The basis of the submission in Lackawanna
was the grievance, even if review of the award did not reach the
grievant's theory of reprisal by the Company for refusal to take vacation
time. Consequently, the judgment upholding the award on the basis of
the submission by grievance should be considered consistent with the
finality postulate in Enterprise Wheel.
The parties may expand the issues beyond those raised by the
grievance. In International Chemical Workers Local 566 v. Mobay
Chemical Corp.,80 the grievance was based on a discharge for failing
to qualify for a skilled job on three occasions. The parties arbitrated
their further agreement to include specifications the Company filed
against the grievant five months after her discharge detailing her un-
satisfactory work record. The arbitrator ruled against the Company
because the CBA did not authorize discharge for three disqualifications
in seeking a skilled job. Nevertheless, the award denied reinstatement
because of the unsatisfactory work record and granted back pay up to
the date the specifications concerning her work record were filed. Quoting
from Enterprise Wheel,81 the court enforced the award, holding that an
award should be enforced when it is not apparent that the arbitrator
exceeded the submission.
Butterkrust Bakeries v. Bakery Confectionery & Tobacco Workers
Local 36182 vacated reinstatement of a discharged grievant, holding that
an arbitrator "can bind the parties only on issues that they have agreed
77. Id. at 235 (J. Gibson, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id.
79. Compare Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 17, 619
F. Supp. 1073 (D. Mass. 1985), supra note 73.
80. 755 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 1112 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 598 (1960)). Another court following Mobay held that an intent to arbitrate
an issue may be implied from the parties' conduct. It was nevertheless undisputed that
the arbitrator was aware of the expiration date (May 18, 1985) and of the date the Union
was decertified (May 15, 1985). The Court vacated reinstatement and back pay in part
(from the period following the expiration of the CBA). Hospital Employees Local 1273
v. Deaton Hosp., 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2964 (D. Md. 1986).
82. 726 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
THE OTHER AGREEMENT
to submit to him."83 The evidence showed that the grievant uttered
belittling remarks to two sanitation employees and slapped the hand of
one of them. One victim then punched the grievant in the face, whereupon
the grievant reached for his pocket, saying: "I'll cut your guts out."
'8 4
Bystanders showed the grievant from the room before any further violence
ensued. The arbitrator considered the grievant's prior history with the
Company, which showed a series of disciplinary sanctions for disturbances
in the plant. According to the court's opinion, the arbitrator found just
cause for discharge, although not on the basis of the latest episode
alone.85 The court found it proper for the arbitrator to have considered
the grievant's disciplinaiy history. However, the award granted rein-
statement on condition that the grievant successfully complete a Dale
Carnegie course. Citing Piggly Wiggly, 86 the court concluded that the
award exceeded the sole issue submitted, i.e., whether there was just
cause for grievant's discharge.87
The dissenting opinion contended that the issues submitted related
only to grievant's latest misconduct, and the application of Company
rules against fighting and using provocative and abusive language.88 The
dissent would find accordingly that the arbitrator exceeded the sub-
mission, but only after finding lack of just cause for discharge in the
grievant's behavior. Although the arbitrator could have found just cause,
83. Id. at 700 (quoting Piggly Wiggly Operator's Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly
Truck Drivers Local 1, 611 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1980)). The opinion described the
submission as variously worded, but it is clear at least that the grievance was based on
discharge.
84. Butterkrust Bakeries v. Bakery Conf. & Tobacco Workers Local 361, 726 F.2d
698, 699 n.2 (I1th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 699.
86. Piggly Wiggly Operator's Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Truck Drivers Local
1, 611 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1980). See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. See also
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), cited in Butterkrust Bakeries
v. Bakery Conf. & Tobacco Workers Local 361, 726 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1984),
supra note 83, adopting as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided
prior to October 1, 1981.
87. The court also vacated the award under the "own-brand-essence" test, in that the
CBA "reposed sole control over employee discipline in Butterkrust and expressly prohibited
modification of its terms.... [so when] the arbitrator found the prerequisite for discharge
to be present, his authority over the matter ceased." Butterkrust Bakeries v. Bakery Conf.
& Tobacco Workers Local 361, 726 F.2d 698, 700 (1lth Cir. 1984). The court relied on
cases from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, rather than United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960), but the award's mitigation of discipline
provides a plausible occasion for vacating the award under the CBA.
88. Butterkrust Bakeries v. Bakery Conf. & Tobacco Workers Local 361, 726 F.2d
698, 701 (l1th Cir. 1984). This opinion appraises the submission from the language of
the termination notice and the Company's statement of the issue in the arbitration hearing,
in addition to the grievance.
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on his finding to the contrary "that should have been the end of his
decision."8 9
It is puzzling that the Butterkrust court found anything in Piggly
Wiggly on which to rely. The court in Piggly Wiggly was clear that
the contents of the grievance constituted the submission, and no inter-
pretation or application of the CBA was at issue, thus eliminating the
"own-brand-essence" test of Enterprise Wheel. In Butterkrust, the judges
disagreed on a "variously worded" form of the submission. Although
they agreed that the award's "Carnegie course" element exceeded the
scope of the submission, they otherwise disagreed on the outer limits
of the submission.
Butterkrust poses a challenge to arbitrators to ascertain what the
parties are submitting, and to define the limits of discretion to provide
an award. Under LMRA section 301, the parties expect a final award
consistent with the submission. The arbitrator has an obligation to the
parties to define the scope of the submission, if possible at the beginning
of the hearing. Ambiguity about the submission confuses the hearing
in that both the parties and the arbitrator are left at sea on offers of
evidence, since each such offer may require a ruling on the scope of
the submission. This piece-meal progress toward defining the submission
could, in most instances, have been precluded earlier in the hearing.
The parties' definition of what they want the arbitrator to decide should
be clear before the parties call witnesses. In Butterkrust, for example,
it does not appear that the arbitrator attempted to find out what belonged
to the submission, whether in accord with the dissenter's definition of
it as confined to grievant's belligerence on one occasion, or the court's
approval of the arbitrator's consideration of grievant's prior disruptions.
It was incumbent on the arbitrator to decide that issue, providing the
parties with the opportunity for judicial review.
Evidence related to the grievant's mental health engaged the arbi-
trator's attention on the just cause issue, when the grievant had been
discharged for insubordination (shouting obscenities at his supervisor).
The court upheld the arbitrator's finding that the shouting was insub-
ordinate conduct, but vacated the award as incomplete for lack of a
finding on just cause for discharge. The award had directed the parties
to select a psychiatrist whose opinion would determine the outcome
(subject to the arbitrator's authority for sixty days after the psychiatrist's
report). If the report showed that the grievant had been mentally ill
and would not recover sufficiently to perform the underground work to
89. Id. The imposition of a Dale Carnegie course was beyond the arbitrator's authority,
but since the grievant did not raise it, this defect is unimportant at the court of appeals
stage.
100
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which he had been assigned, the discharge would be sustained. If the
grievant recovered, he would be reinstated with seniority, but without
backpay. The court remanded for the arbitrator to devise a different
procedure, leaving with the arbitrator the responsibility for determining
the just-cause issue. On remand, the arbitrator would give careful
attention to the weight, relevance, and authenticity of mental-health
evidence. The parties could each produce evidence or agree on a single
examination of the grievant.90 Enterprise Wheel distinguishes between
grievance and remedy in its emphasis upon the arbitrator's discretion
in framing the remedy, even in the face of a CBA provision on remedy.
Contrast this submission: "Did the Company have just and sufficient
cause for the discharge... [of the grievant], and, if not, what is the
appropriate remedy?" The court in Hacienda Hotel v. Culinary Workers
Local 81491 honored the submission in this language as having included
both issues - justifiable cause for discharge and the arbitrator's ability
to devise a remedy. The grievant was discharged for falsifying her
timecards and shouting obscenities at the chief engineer. She fraudently
obtained $1500, using some of it to repay loans from her supervisor.
The supervisor was in collusion with the grievant, and forfeited an annual
bonus. The arbitrator concluded that the sanctions should have been
more equitable and awarded reinstatement and back pay. The court
concluded that even if the arbitrator's concern with disparate treatment
was erroneous, the parties were bound by their submission of the issue
of just cause.
The foregoing cases constitute a gloss on Enterprise Wheel insofar
as it reviewed an award of reinstatement and partial back pay.9 2 Piggly
Wiggly Operators' Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Truck Drivers
90. Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 823 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir 1987). See
infra text accompanying note 159 for a discussion of a procedure that failed abysmally.
91. 175 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1130, 223 Cal. Rptr. 305, 306 (2d Dist. 1985). Similarly,
in Hilton Int'l Co. v. Union de Trabajadores de la Industria Gastronomica Local 610,
600 F. Supp. 1446, 1450 n.9 (D.P.R. 1985), the court upheld the award under the
submission holding that the parties agreed for the arbitrator to "determine, in accordance
to law, and the evidence presented, if the dismissal of [the grievant] was justified or not;
and if not, that the Arbiter provide the adequate remedy." Id. See supra text accompanying
note 1.
92. The CBA there provided:
Should it be determined by the Company or by an arbitrator in accordance
with the grievance procedure that the employee has been suspended unjustly
or discharged in violation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Company
shall reinstate the employee and pay full compensation at the employee's
regular rate of pay for the time lost.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 594 (1960).
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Local 193 sustained the award's remedy of reinstatement and back pay
as well as its upholding the grievance, due to the absence of cause for
discharge under the CBA. Although Enterprise Wheel referred to a
remedial provision in the CBA, the Piggly Wiggly court was satisfied
with the parties' submission on the basis of the grievance. The court
held that the "initial contract to arbitrate may be modified by the
submission agreement or grievance. '94 Similarly, in Lackawanna Leather
Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers District 271,95 the parties'
submission on the grievance was adequate to support the award on both
lack of justifiable cause and the remedy. The submission in Hacienda
Hotel v. Culinary Workers Local 81496 expressly authorized the remedy
if the arbitrator found lack of just and sufficient cause for discharge;
and in Hilton International Co. v. Union de Trabajadores de la Industria
Gastronomica Local 610,97 the submission similarly authorized the ar-
bitrator to provide the adequate remedy if the dismissal of the grievant
was unjustified.
In contrast to these four cases, St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis
Theatrical Brotherhood Local 698 concluded that the remedial part of
the award exceeded the arbitrator's authority. Unlike Piggly Wiggly,
which put aside the CBA provisions because the grievance-the exclusive
basis of the parties' submission-included the remedy issue, the parties
in St. Louis Theatrical had elaborated their CBA agreement providing
further provisions of a procedural nature. The parties were bound thereby
not to make a submission that would modify the CBA. The CBA arbitral
procedures in St. Louis Theatrical required the submission to include
only issues relating to the CBA.99 Thus, it precluded the arbitrator's
consideration of remedy, and limited the issue to whether the grievant
had participated in a "work stoppage." The "essence-own-brand" test
of Enterprise Wheel applies to review of the award on the substantive
terms of the CBA; and yet, in St. Louis Theatrical, that test compared
the submission with the CBA's procedures for arbitration. How far
Piggly Wiggly extends in review of awards that modify the CBA by
virtue of the submission awaits further litigation on the finality of the
CBA.
Other cases vacating an award of reinstatement after discharge are
not readily distinguishable from Enterprise Wheel, which condoned an
arbitrator's discretion to "bring his informed judgment" especially "when
93. 611 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 584.
95. 706 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
96. 175 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 223 Cal. Rptr. 305 (2d Dist. 1985).
97. 600 F. Supp. 1446 (D.P.R. 1985).
98. 715 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
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it comes to formulating remedies."' 00 The Court, although starting with
a CBA remedy of reinstatement and "full compensation at the employee's
regular rate of pay for the time lost,"''1 nevertheless observed that the
drafters of the CBA may never have thought of "what specific remedy
should be awarded to meet a specific situation."'102
The lower courts' gloss is consistent with Enterprise Wheel. The
arbitrator should timely explore any constraints contained in the sub-
mission in considering an award diminishing the Company's discretion
to discharge an employee; the union may be pressing for reinstatement
and otherwise complete restoration of benefits, or, in the alternative,
for some lesser modification of the Company's penalty. 03
Enterprise Wheel warrants remand for further arbitration based on
ambiguity of a back pay award. 04 In Communications Workers v. Radio
Station TLFO,05 the court reviewed the arbitrator's formulation of the
submission: "Did the Company violate [the CBA] by discharging [the
grievant] without cause? If so, the Union seeks reinstatement with back
pay and benefits as the remedy." This method of describing the sub-
mission properly belongs in the opinion leading to the award. 06 The
court found the award failed to clarify whether "cause" for discharge
occurred, when awarding reinstatement and back pay as from thirty
days after grievant's discharge. The court considered the arbitrator's
conclusion that the grievant was not guilty of "gross insubordination,"
but found that he had not determined whether mere insubordination
would constitute cause for discharge under the CBA. Thus, the court
implied that the award should have dismissed the grievance instead of
mitigating the discharge to thirty days' suspension without pay.
When an arbitrator finds just cause for discharge, the remedy portion
in the submission loses its force. The award in Pacific Crown Distibutors
v. Teamsters Local 70107 included back pay from the date of discharge
100. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
101. Id. at 594.
102. Id. at 597.
103. The foregoing cases include two awards upheld on judicial review granting remedies
diluting the Company's discipline. At one extreme, the award in Lackawanna Leather
Co. v. Food Workers Dist. 271, 706 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983), granted reinstatement and
back pay, upholding only the third disciplinary notice. The other award granted partial
back pay only, but otherwise upheld the discharge. International Chem. Workers Local
566 v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 755 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1985).
104. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
105. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2465 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
106. Id. at 2466. The arbitrator's formulation of the submission, when the parties
have not provided a clear text of their agreement, may recite the submitted grievance,
referring to CBA provisions if any are invoked in the grievance. It is not uncommon that
the parties will defer attention to the submission until the arbitrator has heard their
opening statements.
107. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 228 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1st Dist. 1986).
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to the date of the award even though the discharge was upheld. The
award found that the Company violated the CBA in relieving the grievant
from duty on the date of discharge instead of waiting for it to be upheld
under the grievance procedure. Since the Union raised this contention
for the first time in its post-hearing brief, the court vacated the award,
holding that a union cannot force modification of a submission on an
unconsenting employer. The court also rejected the Union's contention
that John Wiley grants the court the discretion on review of an issue
of procedural arbitrability to uphold the award.108
In Pacific Crown, the court relied on Food Workers Local 274 v.
Clougherty Packing Co.09 In Food Workers, the hearing began with a
quite detailed submission of several issues, but did not include a state
law issue. The arbitrator was persuaded that the state statute governed
instead of the CBA provision about loss of seniority after a specified
period of disability. Consequently, the award granted the grievant the
relief sought. The court upheld the award on the ground that the
Company allowed the additional issue to become part of the submission.
The converse situation went to arbitration in Television and Radio
Artists, Cleveland Local v. Storer Broadcasting Co.," 0 in which the
Union sought discharge of an employee for not being a member of the
Union even though assigned to bargaining unit duties as an "assignment
editor." The award sustained the grievance, ordering that the employee
be given the opportunity to join the Union or be discharged. The CBA
provided for a union shop, except "supervisors as defined in the NLRA
as amended.""' When the Union sued to enforce the award, the district
court remanded for arbitration of the employee's supervisory status in
acting as assignment editor. After the arbitrator found assignment editors
not to be supervisors, the district court disagreed and vacated the award.
The court of appeals sustained the award except in its remedy, which
the court re-formulated. The Union was not entitled to have the employee
discharged, but if the employee failed to join the Union, he must be
removed as assignment editor. The opinion otherwise upheld the award,
quoting from W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759,112 and
found the district judge in error for second-guessing the arbitrator's
interpretation of "supervisor." The parties bargained for that interpre-
tation, which involved a mixed question of fact and law, and except
108. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
109. 154 Cal. App. 3d 282, 201 Cal. Rptr. 183 (2d Dist. 1984).
110. 745 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1984).
111. Id. at 395.
112. "Because the authority of arbitrators is a subject of collective bargaining, just
as is any other contractual provision, the scope of the arbitrator's authority is itself a
104
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for the remedial component of the award the arbitrator "was doing
exactly what the parties agreed he should do." 13
The reviewing court typically compares a submission connecting the
dispute with a substantive provision in the CBA requiring the Company
to have cause for discharge. If a violation is found, the parties will also
have submitted the remedy issue, whether the grievant should be rein-
stated with back pay. In Communications Workers v. Radio Station
WUFO,"4 the court remanded for a clarification of an award of rein-
statement and back pay. The court considered the conclusion that the
grievant was not guilty of "gross insubordination" as short of determining
whether mere insubordination would constitute cause under the CBA.
The arbitrator's clarification on remand persuaded the court to uphold
the award as based on lack of cause for discharge.115
The court's remand may depend upon evidence transpiring after the
award. In Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Local 4-228 v. Union
Oil Co. of California,' 6 the award granted the grievant reinstatement
in 1985 on the basis of the arbitrator's estimate that her drug habit
constituted a low risk of future indulgence, but subsequent positive tests
led the court to remand on the question whether her reinstatement
"could have carried the portent for damages to herself, her fellow
workers, or the refinery."'' 7
In Misco,"5 the grievant was discharged for violation of Company
Rule 11.1 which prohibits bringing controlled substances onto plant
premises. Its violation is cause for discharge. After the parties submitted
question of contract interpretation that the parties have delegated to the arbitrator." Id.
at 398 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 765
(1983)). See supra note 70. In W.R. Grace, the submission was by court decree, not
voluntary agreement. That is, the Court was not pronouncing on the Piggly Wiggly
observation that subsequent collective bargaining in the submission may modify the CBA
arbitration clause. See Piggly Wiggly Operator's Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Truck
Drivers Local 1, 611 F.2d 580, 584 (1st Cir. 1980). Compare from Johnston Boiler Co.
v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 893, 753 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir. 1985) ("But
we do hold that the presumption of authority that attaches to an arbitrator's award applies
with equal force to his decision that his award is within the submission.").
113. Television & Radio Artists, Cleveland Local v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 745 F.2d
392, 400 (6th Cir. 1984).
114. 126 L.R.RM. (BNA) 2240 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
115. Despite the latitude of discretion afforded an arbitrator's consideration of remedies
upholding a discharge grievance under Enterprise Wheel, the opinion leading to the award
requires explicit analysis of the submission with respect to the underlying issue of whether
the grievance is to be sustained as well as the basis for the remedy. In such a disposition,
special care is needed in fashioning an award that will not require further arbitration on
remand.
116. 818 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1987).
117. Id. at 443.
118. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1988).
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their dispute on the grievance, the award granted the prayer for relief
that the grievant be reinstated with backpay and full seniority. The
parties had stipulated the issue as whether the Company had "just cause
to discharge the grievant under Rule II.1" and "[i]f not, what if any
should be the remedy."' 9
The award found that the Company did not have just cause. The
arbitrator, in discussing that issue, invoked seven criteria, among which
he took into account only the information given the Company up to
the time of the discharge. In particular, as the Company asserted in
discharging the grievant, he was found in a car on the premises of the
Company under circumstances violating the Rule prohibiting possessing
drugs on plant premises. Those circumstances were that the grievant
was apprehended in the back seat of the car with marijuana smoke in
the air and a lighted marijuana cigarette in the front-seat ashtray.
The District Court vacated the award. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
concluding that the arbitrator had ample proof that the Rule was violated.
The Court, however, reversed, upholding the award. Its unanimous
opinion (on the Rule violation) expounds two perspectives: that the mere
claim of improvident, even silly, fact-finding will not suffice to disregard
the arbitrator's determination of what happened;1 20 and that even if the
reviewing court can disagree on the factual basis in favor of cause for
discharge the arbitrator normally has authority to disagree with the
sanction imposed by the employer.1 2 1
VII. DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
No-STRIKE CLAUSE
A Company grievance seeking damages for breach of the CBA no-
strike clause went to arbitration in Daniel Construction Co. v. Operating
Engineers Local 513.122 When members of the back-fill crew arrived at
the construction site, they were ordered to depart immediately. All the
operating engineers except two left their jobs. After four shifts had
refused to work, the Union agreed to send representatives to persuade
the next shift to stay on the job. The parties agreed in submitting the
issue of what items of damages the Company was entitled to by law
119. Id. at 368.
120. Id. at 371.
121. The Court's opinion quotes from Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593, 597, concerning
the remedial discretion of the arbitrator. The Court also describes the proper course for
courts to follow before vacating on just cause would be remand for the arbitrator to make
a definitive construction of the contract. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 364, 372-73. The Court thus supplements Enterprise Wheel in relation to
remand, on violation as well as remedy, but the Court has already upheld the award on
the just-cause issue.
122. 738 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1984).
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and whether the Union was entitled to assert a defense under the
collateral source rule, relating to the Company's cost-plus contract with
the owner. The CBA contained no remedial provision for violation of
its no-strike clause. The court upheld the award which rejected some
of the damage claims as too speculative and otherwise denied the
grievance. The Company failed to show that it had strike-related costs
beyond those for which it had realized reimbursement from the owner.
When a party agrees to be bound by the award, it is final if the
arbitrator "stays within the areas marked out for his consideration.' ' 2
VIII. JOB SECURITY
Court-reviewed awards have involved loss of job security, whether
from displacement by machinery or from other causes. One aspect of
this subject involves how the parties have agreed to accept loss of work-
places and the use of collectively bargained systems of seniority governing
which workers would be laid off.
The Court in Humphrey v. Moore'24 sanctioned the combination of
two seniority lists by dovetailing into one. The "arbitrator" was a Joint
Committee composed of an equal number of representatives of the union
and the employers of two bargaining units. The system was based upon
a multi-employer system from which disputes arising between the union
and a member employer would go to the Joint Committee unless settled
at the local level.
Two CBA's, between the same local union and two haulers of au-
tomobiles were alike in both their agreement to arbitration and in
requiring submission to the grievance procedure of controversies gen-
erated by the employer's absorption of the business of another carrier.
The employers, E&L and Dealers Transport, were haulers from the
Louisville, Kentucky assembly plant of the Ford Motor Co. When Ford
informed them that there was, as the result of declining business, room
for only one of them in the Louisville operation, the haulers agreed to
a multi-location plan by which Dealers Transport would absorb E&L's
work from Louisville. On recommendation of the local union and in
reliance upon a provision of the Dealers Transport CBA, the Joint
Committee awarded dovetailing at Dealers Transport (in Louisville) the
seniority of E & L drivers with the seniority of Dealers drivers.
123. Id. at 301 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 598 (1960)). The reciprocal set of union grievances about reinstatement of
strikers [&] Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas Local 226 v. Riverboat Casino, 817 F.2d
524 (9th Cir. 1987), went to arbitration under a submission excluding the panel from
exercising equitable authority. The court held (on the issue of whether a strike settlement
agreement existed) that acceptance of an offer by silence is not exclusively an equitable
principle.
124. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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The Court found the award final and binding. First, the record lacked
adequate support for the plaintiff's attack on the integrity of the Union
and the procedures which led to the award. Second, the absorption
provision of the CBA reasonably meant that it was applicable to this
dispute, because there was an absorption and that provision did deal
with both jobs 25 and seniority. Although the seniority of most of the
E & L drivers was greater than that of the Dealers Transport drivers,
the Joint Committee's "decision to integrate lists upon the basis of
service at either company was neither unique nor arbitrary. On the
contrary, it is a familiar and frequently equitable solution to the inevitably
conflicting interests which arise in the wake of a merger or an absorption
such as occurred here."' 126
In Griesmann v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,127 the parties
bargained under two CBA's, one for the cement drivers and the other
for the liquid ("tank") drivers. The cement drivers worked from a
cement terminal in Stockertown and at a Nazareth terminal. In 1982,
hauling of both cement and liquid began at Nazareth with respective
seniority lists for either type of work. That combination resulted upon
closing the Stockertown (cement) terminal and the Company's including
the Stockertown cement drivers in the Nazareth seniority list.
Liquid drivers (at Nazareth) enjoyed a practice that seems to have
been uncontroverted: if liquid hauling was slack, they could be dispatched
for "overflow" work needed for cement hauling after all seniority-list
cement haulers had been dispatched (and similarly on liquid hauling
for cement drivers, on "overflow" existing after exhaustion of the liquid
drivers list).
The liquid drivers' grievance against the melding of Stockertown
cement drivers with Nazareth cement drivers in 1982 rested on a
provision in the 1977 agreement that the Company would add no more
drivers to the cement list. The arbitrator dismissed grievances filed by
eight liquid drivers. The arbitrator received two documents: a Company
notice on May 20, 1977, reciting the agreement of the parties that
Nazareth cement drivers could transfer to the bottom of the liquid list,
but had to do so by May 31, 1977, at 8:00 a.m., after which "no
additional drivers would be added to the cement list"; and a letter of
the same tenor issuing from negotiations that preceded the notice. Thus,
the eight grievants relied upon those documents as foreclosing the
Company's asserted duty in 1982 to meld the Stockertown cement
125. Plaintiffs argued that the CBA absorption provision granted authority over sen-
iority only, and not over job security.
126. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 347 (1964).
127. 776 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985).
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drivers' seniority list with that of the Nazareth cement drivers. The
Joint Committee, although receiving those documents, heard no argument
or evidence either from the Company or the Union on whether they
evidenced a contract to not add drivers to the cement seniority list after
the door was closed on May 31, 1977.
The district court overturned the award against the grievants and
granted eighteen plaintiffs, including the eight grievants, their motion
for summary judgment against the Company.1 2 Its decision drew upon
the 1977 promise as a matter of law that "no additional drivers [would]
be added to the cement list" 29 after May 31, 1977. Although the district
court refused to instruct the jury that the 1977 agreement was a contract,
the plaintiffs were permitted to argue that premise to the jury. The
jury found against the plaintiff Company and it appealed the district
court's order on its liability. 30
The appellate court found that the trial court erred both in deciding
the Company's liability as a matter of law, and in the manner it sent
the plaintiffs' claim against the Union to the jury. The court remanded
for a jury trial against both defendants. The centerpiece of its opinion
contains three points: (1) although the 1977 notice did manifest a
contract, its meaning is for the jury; (2) the Joint Committee's award
is final, unless the jury sets it aside as the product of the Union's
default in its duty of fair representation; and (3) (implicitly) both
defendants enjoy the benefit of the Joint Committee's award unless
plaintiffs persuade the jury that it was the product of the Union's breach
of its duty of fair representation of the unit consisting of the liquid
drivers.'3'
The district court erred in construing the 1977 contract against the
Company after rejecting evidence proffered on its meaning 3 2 and in
avoiding the award as an obstacle to plaintiffs' case. The court of appeals
stressed the intertwining of the claims against both Company and Union
in remanding for jury trial anew.
The significance of the case lies in the court of appeals' view of
"permissive" and "mandatory" arbitration. That distinction seems to
128. The parties agreed to postpone the issue of damages and try liability first.
129. Griesmahn v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir.
1985).
130. The court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982), granting an interlocutory appeal.
Id. at 68.
131. The Joint Committee apparently made no findings regarding breach of the Union's
duty. See Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986) (arbitrator's finding in
excess of authority on this issue not binding). The court referred to Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967), and Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), in
connection with jury instructions on retrial.
132. Even if the terms of the 1977 Notice were ambiguous, it did not manifest an
integrated contract (excluding parol evidence of the meaning of the contract). Griesmann
v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 1985).
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relate to whether the parties were bound by the CBA to submit the
existing dispute to arbitration. The opinion concludes that the submission
to the Joint Committee was "mandatory," but would make no difference
if it were "permissive." The court's opinion relied on Teamsters Local
764 v. J.H. Merritt & Co.133 and observed that neither the Union nor
the Company objected to the Joint Committee's hearing the grievance.13 4
Two seniority lists were involved in the simpler case of Chicago Web
Printing Pressmens Union No. 7 v. Chicago Newspaper Publishers Ass'n.
135 For thirty years the parties operated under an unwritten seniority
system, one list for the day chapel and the other for the night. Transfer
from one to the other was possible, but only by resignation from one
and starting over as a new hire on the other.
When the Company replaced letter presses with offset presses, ex-
tensive training to operate the offset presses became necessary. The
parties engaged in negotiations on whether to replace the old seniority
system, but the parties concluded a six-year CBA without reference to
seniority, like its predecessors. The Company then posted a notice
announcing that henceforth seniority would be determined on a company-
wide basis. "The parties did not either orally or in writing agree to a
formal submission for the arbitrator."' 36 The matter was arbitrated on
the basis of the Union grievance. It challenged the policy of the notice
as violating the long-standing practice, in that it had become part of
the CBA.
The Union contended that the only way to alter a past practice was
through negotiation. The Company contended that the parties had agreed
to alter it and, alternatively, that the Union's agreement was not essential
to the change because the conditions on which the two-chapel system
was based no longer pertained. The arbitrator denied the grievance
finding that the parties had not agreed to eliminate the system and
that the past practice was not part of the CBA. Rather, the change in
conditions was sufficient to warrant the Company, after negotiations
failed, to change the past practice unilaterally.
The award was upheld because the submission included the issue
whether the Company had agreed with the Union that the two-chapel
system could be terminated only by negotiations. Thus, "the arbitrator
was not confined to deciding whether the parties' past practice had
been ended by negotiation alone."' 3 7
133. 770 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1985).
134. Griesmann v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 66, 73 (3d Cir.
1985). Cf. supra text accompanying note 56.
135. 772 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1985).
136. Id. at 386.
137. Id. at 387. The court addressed the essence test of Enterprise Wheel and found
it satisfied. Further review of the arbitrator's finding of change in conditions was denied.
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Another type of work preservation dispute arises when the employer
contracts to have another employer furnish work to complement the
primary employer's enterprise. For example, the primary employer may
find it expedient to hire another employer for maintenance work within
the primary employer's plant. In Warrior and Gulf,3' the Court dis-
tinguished between substantive terms concerning "sub-contracting" and
the procedural clause of the CBA. The court ordered arbitration of the
later-arising dispute, because it related to the substantive terms, and
the CBA's (procedural) promises to arbitrate lacked an exception ad-
dressed to the grievance.
Although Warrior and Gulf resolved the issue whether an existing
dispute about sub-contracting was arbitrable under the CBA, in Enter-
prise Wheel the Court decided that the award was final under judicial
review, with an exception for remand to the arbitrator to determine
back pay. Enterprise Wheel differs from Warrior and Gulf in that
Warrior and Gulf did not review an award and Enterprise Wheel did
not involve a dispute about sub-contracting.
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Allied Industrial Workers Local 209119
followed Warrior and Gulf and W.R. Grace. The parties submitted
whether the Company violated the CBA "by the actions it took relative
to the performance of work in the Parts and Accessories Warehouse on
and after January 5, 1982 [and if so] what is the remedy?" 40 The
arbitrator heard evidence of a prior award for the Company, but found
it distinguishable from the grievance. The prior award, according to the
arbitrator, was based on a short-term sub-contract when no employees
were on lay-off and "the business was booming."' 141 The arbitrator found
those circumstances inapplicable to the Company's sub-contracting that
prompted the grievance before him.
The arbitrator agreed with the Company that its purpose in sub-
contracting was economic, but found that it nevertheless violated the
CBA in that the Company discriminated against the Union to achieve
that purpose.142
In upholding the award, the court held that the conclusiveness of
the arbitrator's legal interpretations "should apply to all parties who
submit a matter to arbitration.., whether the arbitrator's authority
stems from the parties' consent, albeit unrequired by the Agreement,
138. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
139. 613 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
140. Id. at 292.
141. Id.
142. The court held that the arbitrator did not disregard the law and properly relied
on L.A. Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 702 (1978), affd sub nom. Ayers v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1979). (The Board overruled L.A. Marine
in Milwaukee Spring Div. II, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984)).
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or whether it stems from contractual terms to which the parties consented
when they entered into the Agreement.1 43
Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. Carpenters Local 22914 reviewed an award
based on a stipulated submission which submitted two issues: "Whether
[the Company] violated the 1981-1983 labor agreement... by contract-
ing out work while members of the bargaining unit... were on layoff;
and if so, what shall be the remedy."' 45 Over the Company's objection,
the arbitrator heard evidence of contracting out in 1983 while millwrights
were on layoff. On contracting out in 1982, the arbitrator found no
violation because the contracting out was in response to an emergency,
but upheld the grievances of the millwrights laid off in 1983. The court
denied modification or vacation of the award. Both the grievance and
the stipulation specifically covered the 1983 contracting. The case in
effect sustains the arbitrator's discretion under the submission to rule
on objections to evidence.
Job security cases as presented here do not retreat to the "own-
brand-essence" test. Even in Griesrnann, the Court of Appeals, in moving
judicial review from the bench to the jury, gave it to judge the meaning
of the contract (rather than, as had the district judge, who ignored it),
in the context of the entangled issue of fair representation. 146
IX. INCOMPLETE AWARDS
Geoffrey Beene, Inc. v. Coat Workers 47 concludes these cases on
scope of the arbitrator's authority in disputes on job protection or work
preservation and introduces three other cases on incomplete awards. The
Union obtained an award based on the Company's violation of a CBA
provision requiring the Union's consent to reorganizing the factory. The
Company had eliminated its "Beene Bag" line by licensing it to Bobby
Brooks, another garment industry employer. The Union's grievance pro-
tested the licensing agreement, but on judicial review of the award
143. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Allied Indus. Workers Local 209, 613 F. Supp.
291, 294 (E.D. Wis. 1985). Cf. International Chem. Workers Local 526 v. Day &
Zimmerman, Inc., 791 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 274 (1986)
(award upheld when parties authorized the arbitrator to frame the submission within his
interpretation of the CBA).
144. 109 A.D.2d 991, 486 N.Y.S.2d 472 (3d Dept. 1985).
145. Id.
146. Other cases at the margin of job security also test the award as compared to
the submission. One concerns reporting pay. Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union v.
Decatur & Hopkins Co., 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2959 (D. Mass. 1987). How good was
the employees' grievance under a CBA provision for eight hours' pay in lieu of notice
not to report for work (at six and seven a.m.) when Governor Dukakis didn't proclaim a
state of emergency from hurricane Gloria until 8:30 a.m.? The award sustained the
grievance but granted pay for two and a half and one and a half hours only.
147. 562 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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the Company denied that it had agreed to submit issues relating to the
Bobby Brooks agreement; rather, its agreement to the submission ex-
tended only to whether it violated the CBA in Beene Bag's going out
of business. The court found that the arbitrator had said it was his
practice to decide the stated issues and that the Company did not object
further than to admonish the arbitrator not to exceed his powers.
After the award was issued, the arbitrator wrote a supplemental
opinion that included this language: "An employer may not unilaterally
determine what issues may be arbitrated. To allow this would permit
the employer to circumscribe the authority given [the arbitrator] by
refusing to submit clearly arbitrable issues of contract interpretation to
hearing."148
The court sustained the award. The court endorsed the arbitrator's
"practice" and formulation of the submission and the above language
in his supplemental opinion. The submission as a part of collective
bargaining, however, has to be consensual, not a product of the Union's
unilateral demands, whether in the grievance or otherwise. If either
party refuses to agree to arbitraton of the dispute, the issue belongs to
the courts under AT&T Technologies, Warrior and Gulf, and American
Manufacturing. The court, in its conclusion'that the arbitrator's authority
extended to consideration of the Bobby Brooks agreement, appears to
have found the Company's equivocal admonition inadequate to exclude
that agreement from the issues submitted. If so, endorsing the passage
from the arbitrator's opinion does not seem a flagrant contradiction of
the doctrine that arbitrability of the dispute belongs to the courts unless
the parties incorporate that question in the submission.
The award in Geoffrey Beene was incomplete since it contained no
remedy, so the court remanded to the arbitrator for determination of
appropriate forms of relief.
With respect to the arbitrator's duty to complete the submission by
rendering an award that answers all the issues, Courier-Citizen Co. v.
Boston Electrotypers Union 11149 offers an intertwining of two awards
148. Id. at 1320.
149. 702 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1983). The court properly remands for determination of
remedy in light of (and merely for the arbitrator's consideration of) the effect, if any, of
a successor CBA. International Chem. Workers Local 526 v. Day & Zimmeinan, Inc.,
791 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 274 (1986). An award determining the
Company's liability under the CBA, but returning the issue of remedy to the parties,
reserving authority to resolve their disagreement, exceeded the submission: "[A]nd if so,
what remedy?" In Millmen Local 550 v. Wells Exterior Trim, 828 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th
Cir. 1987), the court distinguished Enterprise Wheel, in that there the award contained
a remedy, and vacated the district court's summary judgment confirming the arbitrator's
decision. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Aurora Equip. Co., 830 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1987)
(district court remand to arbitrator is not a final appealable judgment).
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by two arbitrators. A job-protection problem arose when the Company
installed labor-saving devices, and in May 1975, laid off several members
of the bargaining unit (journeymen). The Union represented journeymen
but not laborers. When the Company hired G, a laid-off journeyman,
to a laborer's job, the Union filed a grievance. The matter came before
arbitrator H on this submission: 50 "1. Is the matter arbitrable? 2. Did
the Company violate the contract by placing [G] in a laborer's job on
June 23, 1975? If so, what shall be the remedy?"'' H's award of
February 12, 1976, sustained the grievance but did not order recall or
grant back pay for any specific employee in place of G. Instead, it
ordered back pay to "the senior journeyman," to be computed on G's
pay minus the senior's earnings from the same period, and the arbitrator
"retained jurisdiction" in the event the parties were unable to resolve
subsequently-arising questions. 52
The award took this shape due to the parties' earlier submission to
arbitrator S of issues on computing seniority as among the journeymen.
S's award had not issued on February 12, the date of H's. On July 26,
S awarded primary seniority to K, but the Company rejected the Union's
insistence on offering K the laborer's job and granting back pay. The
Union then applied to arbitrator H under the award's reservation for
disputes subsequently arising under the award. The Company objected
to the Union's application and refused to participate in the hearing, but
had not earlier objected to the reservation. H nevertheless proceeded
ex parte with the Union'53 and issued a supplemental award on March
3, 1977 favoring K.
The court affirmed the award as to K, on the basis of a careful
examination of doctrines on the duration of authority under an arbitral
submission. 54
In Brewery and Beverage Drivers Local 67 v. Canada Dry Potomac
Corp., 55 the Company unilaterally changed the size of cases from two
to eight bottles. The bottles held two litres each. The Union's grievance
went to arbitration. The arbitrator found the grievance arbitrable, that
the employees continued to receive the same rate of commission per
case, and that the Company had thereby reduced the rate in violation
of a CBA prohibition against reducing pay rates. The award sustained
150. Id.
151. Id. at 275.
152. See Hilton Int'l Co. v. Union de Trabajadores de Ia Industria Gastronomica
Local 610, 600 F. Supp. 1446 (D.P.R. 1985) (approving reservation by arbitrator of
authority to hear the parties further in the event of disputes on computing back pay).
153. Cf. "Ex Parte Hearings," Opinion No. 13 of the National Academy of Arbitrators
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Grievances, June 7, 1986.
154. CourierCitizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11, 702 F.2d 273, 279-
80 (1st Cir. 1983). The court vacated the supplemental award as to another journeyman
because the original submission did not include a grievance in behalf of that journeyman.
155. 628 F. Supp. 73 (D.D.C. 1986).
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the grievance and directed the parties to bargain the increase. (The
arbitrator was of the view that his authority did not extend to directing
an increase, because to do so would add to the CBA.) The Company
sued for modification of the award, without objection to arbitration on
the merits. The court granted the Company's motion for summary
judgment and remanded for the arbitrator to direct appropriate relief.
The opinion relies on Enterprise Wheel for its holding on the remedial
liscretion of the arbitrator.
IBEW Local 1837 v. Maine Public Service Co.156 also relates to the
duty of the arbitrator to award a remedy. Workers were accustomed
to taking breaks for coffee at a restaurant en route to the office in
company vehicles. The Company unilaterally put a stop to this practice
by requiring that coffee breaks be taken on Company premises. The
submission: "Did the Company violate the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment by implementing a change in the coffee break policy/procedure
on or about December 1, 1981? If so, what shall be the remedy?"' 57
The arbitrator found the past practice "contractually binding" and
ordered the parties to negotiate concerning the change. The parties
failed to agree. The court remanded to the arbitrator for formulating
a remedy. The court decided that the question about the remedy in the
submission did not authorize disregard of the CBA, and hence the
submission did not constitute a modification of the CBA1 58
The "preliminary" award in Steelworkers v. Ideal Cement Co.5 9
suggested a post-hearing procedure for providing the arbitrator with
additional medical information concerning the grievant. Only the Union
followed the suggestion but mailed the information ex parte. The award
was based on wrongful termination of the grievant's employment. In a
cover letter for the award the arbitrator explained that he had not read
the Union's information. The cover letter offered the Company the
choice of accepting the award or voiding it and disqualifying the
arbitrator. The Company took the latter option. The arbitrator did not
hear further from the Union and set the award aside and disqualified
himself. The Union sued to enforce the award or to re-submit the dispute
to arbitration. The Company's answer agreed to re-submission and the
court ordered it remanded to another arbitrator of the parties' choice.
These two awards, the preliminary one and the one under the cover
letter offering to set it aside, provided an occasion for judicial review
for completeness of awards lacking in finality for failure to resolve the
remedy issue.
156. 579 F. Supp. 744 (D. Me. 1984).
157. Id. at 746.
158. On the relationship between CBA and submission, see supra text accompanying
note 94.
159. 762 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1985).
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X. CONCLUSIONS
So-called procedural arbitrability has received consistent treatment
in the cases under John Wiley and Flair Builders. The courts consistently
distinguish issues arising prior to arbitration as initially arbitrable when
they are relevant to an arbitrable dispute. What remains unclear is
whether the test is applicable on judicial review. Misco was apparently
not the "vehicle" for the Court to address the judicial-review test, and
its holding generates uncertainty about the application of procedural
arbitrability to issues of arbitration hearing procedure. Alternatively,
W.R. Grace has, for the most part, effectively supplemented Enterprise
Wheel by influencing courts in review of an award to channel reyiew
of a prior award into arbitration.
The cases on submission of arbitrability offer room for advocates and
arbitrators to ruminate on whether the submission, if not compelled (as
in Misco), includes arbitrability for the arbitrator's initial decision.
Indeed, the court in Boston Edison160 solved the problem of a submission
consisting solely of arbitrability with a novel remedy in addition to those
of AT&T Technologies and its predecessors (by way of remand for
arbitration after vacating the award). The cases on submission of (sub-
stantive) arbitrability and on modes of submission stress for the advocates
and the arbitrator what is needed for the advocates to police the precision
of the submission, lest the award be vulnerable in its incompleteness or
excess of authority.
Piggly Wiggly 6 may be the leading case on the parties' discretion
in formulating the submission in relation to a prior CBA that provides
for arbitration, but other cases, especially on discharge grievances,
address that issue. (It did not arise in Misco; the Court found no
deviation from the CBA in the submission.) The topics on no-strike
clause and job security appear to justify the conclusion that the cases
in general find the award within the authority granted by the submission.
The final topic, on incomplete awards, is essentially procedural and
related to the discretion of the trial court.
The spirit of this Article will have been to some extent borne out if
it succeeds in laying emphasis on "the other agreement." This emphasis
accords a balanced reading of Enterprise Wheel as between the "own-
brand-essence" test under the CBA, and the lower courts' struggle in
reviewing awards based on the submission.
160. Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11, 752 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.
1984).
161. Piggly Wiggly Operator's Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Truck Drivers Local
1, 611 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1980).
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